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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I register disagreement with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer on 
three significant issues. First, Sidgwick does not give utilitarianism the advantage over Ros-
sian pluralistic intuitionism. Both views are still very much in the running. Second, his du-
alism survives their evolutionary argument. The egoist principle is no more or less vulner-
able to debunking than the principle of impartial benevolence. Third, though his view on 
pleasure is not entirely clear, Sidgwick is best understood to be offering a traditional ‘feel-
ing-tone’ account of pleasure, rather than a view which gives a significant role to the ‘ap-
prehension’ of the subject. 
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Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (LRS) are sensitive and chari-
table readers of Sidgwick, and I agree with most of their interpretations and 
their claims about Sidgwick’s contemporary relevance.1 But I do wish to regis-
ter disagreement with them on three significant issues. First, Sidgwick does 
not give utilitarianism the advantage over Rossian pluralistic intuitionism. 
Both views are still very much in the running. Second, his dualism survives 
their evolutionary argument. The egoist principle is no more or less vulnerable 
to debunking than the principle of impartial benevolence. Third, though his 
view on pleasure is not entirely clear, Sidgwick is best understood to be offer-
ing a traditional ‘feeling-tone’ account of pleasure, rather than a view which 
gives a significant role to the ‘apprehension’ of the subject. 
 
1 See their The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). All unattributed references in the text are to this work. 
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1. INTUITION 
As LRS note (82), W.D. Ross’s view is a development of that found in Reid, 
Price, and Whewell; they focus on Ross, which seems to me the right strategy, 
since there is no stronger form of deontological pluralism available. Consider 
this claim by Ross: 
If, so far as I can see, I could bring equal amounts of good into being by ful-
filling my promise and by helping someone to whom I had made no promise, I 
should not hesitate to regard the former as my duty [and] normally promise-
keeping […] should come before benevolence.2 
Ross’s example brings out the inclination many people have to think that 
breaking a promise has normative weight of its own, independently of utility 
considerations. 
Promising, Sidgwick rightly believes, provides the best case for the deontol-
ogist (ME 353).3 But, like Sidgwick (ME 303-11; 353-4), LRS find the principle 
that, other things equal, promises should be kept too vague to be plausible (85-
6). Consider, for example, cases in which you have promised only because cer-
tain important considerations have been concealed, or in which your promise 
is the result of coercion. 
Ross’s response to similar objections made by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge is to 
appeal to the spirit of any promise rather than to its letter.4 Most promises, he 
points out, are made without there being any need to spell out their implied 
conditions.5 
But LRS may object that the fact remains: the Rossian view is too vague. 
LRS here show the same unwillingness as Sidgwick himself to allow any 
significant role in ethics for practical judgement in particular cases.6 Philo-
sophical ethics, Sidgwick tells us, aims like science to be ‘systematic and pre-
cise’ (ME 1). He later says that the assumption that moral rules should be pre-
cise ‘naturally belongs to the ordinary or jural view of Ethics as concerned 
with a moral code’ (ME 228), and provides an argument for this view based on 
an apt analogy with law. If a law were vague, we would think it to that extent 
unreasonable: anyone subject to a legal obligation ought to be in a position to 
 
2 W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930),18-19. 
3 References to ME are to Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London: Mac-
millan, 1907). 
4 W.D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 87-99. 
5 Ibid., 98. 
6 Some of the following paragraphs adapt material from ch. 1 of my The Cosmos of Duty: 
Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015). 
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know what it is. Similarly, a moral philosophy which left it unclear on some 
occasion exactly what a person’s obligations were would, to that extent, have 
failed. 
A good deal of law is indeed highly precise. The UK Representation of the 
People Act 1969, for example, leaves no doubt about when a person becomes 
eligible to vote in a parliamentary election: on their eighteenth birthday. But 
some law is less precise. Consider, for example, the definition of obscenity in 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959, still in force in the UK: 
For the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect 
or (where the article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one 
of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons 
who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear 
the matter contained or embodied in it. 
If I have written some potentially obscene article, and am considering its 
publication in the UK, the law will not tell me whether or not it is safe for me 
to publish it. I have to rely on my judgement about the likely effects of its pub-
lication, and whether they might be described as depravation or corruption. 
Now it might be said that Sidgwick is right that, to this extent, the law is a fail-
ure, and legislators should seek further precision. But even if they did – per-
haps by spelling out further what is meant by depravation and giving examples 
of what is and what is not to count as obscene – there will be an ineliminable 
role for judgement on the part of citizens. A law is not a failure if it is reasona-
bly clear, and relies only to a reasonable degree on individual judgement. And 
the same is true of moral principles such as Ross’s on promising. 
In his discussion of a pluralistic intuitionism that allows for individual 
judgement, John Rawls says the following:7 
[T]here is nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. In-
deed, it may be true. We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete 
derivation of our judgments … from recognizably ethical principles. The intui-
tionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies our 
efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of 
competing principles. He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles 
either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every 
man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, as when one settles 
everything by the principle of utility. The only way therefore to dispute intuition-
 
7 Rawls (A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (Harvard: Belknap, 1999), 30n18) cites Barry, Brandt, 
and Rescher as intuitionists, noting that the intuitionism of earlier writers such as Ross includ-
ed certain epistemological theses concerning self-evidence and necessity. But I presume Rawls 
would allow that Ross is in agreement with the pluralism of general principles, and the need for 
judgement between them in individual cases, which Rawls refers to as ‘intuitionism’. 
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ism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights 
which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality 
of principles. A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of con-
structive criteria that are said not to exist. To be sure, the notion of a recogniza-
bly ethical principle is vague, although it is easy to give many examples drawn 
from tradition and common sense. But it is pointless to discuss this matter in the 
abstract. The intuitionist and his critic will have to settle this question once the 
latter has put forward his more systematic account.8 
So the first question we might ask is whether Sidgwick’s own utilitarianism 
is in a better position than Rossian pluralism. Judgement is involved in accept-
ing utilitarianism to start with, but it will also be involved in assessing the im-
plications of the principle in particular cases. Consider some apparently sim-
ple case in which I have to decide between two delicious desserts. Sidgwick 
himself, in his discussion of empirical hedonism in ME 2.2-3, brings out how 
difficult such a decision might be. I shall have to recall earlier experiences with 
each kind of dessert, analyse the quality of each of those on offer, and then 
make a judgement based on the evidence before me. It is not clear why such 
judgements are any easier than trying to decide what to do in the case of the 
promise and the accident. Judgement is inescapable. What matters is how best 
to ensure that one’s judgements are correct. 
Of course, Rossian pluralists should not be against system, and most are 
not; indeed, systematization is the point of Ross’s list of prima facie duties. But 
we have to remember that, however much systematizing we do, the context of 
human decision-making is sufficiently complex and unpredictable that any 
plausible ethical theory has to allow some room for individual judgement 
about particular cases. How best to acquire that capacity for judgement is a 
difficult question, and one insufficiently discussed by philosophers (including 
Aristotle and Ross). But its significance is beyond reasonable doubt. 
LRS (87-8) note Ross’s ad hominem criticism of pluralistic forms of utilitar-
ianism, according to which well-being consists in a number of different goods, 
that it too must rely on judgement to decide between such goods. Their re-
sponse is to claim that ‘a monistic form of utilitarianism, like hedonistic utili-
tarianism, is in principle in a better position’. But this is to forget pain. A view 
which advocates only the maximizing of pleasure is clearly absurd; so even he-
donistic utilitarianism turns out to be pluralistic.9 There is perhaps a signifi-
cant difference between genuine monism and pluralism; but the difference be-
 
8 Ibid., 34-5. 
9 See Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 89. 
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tween a theory with seven prima facie or pro tanto duties, and a theory with 
two (‘maximize pleasure’ and ‘minimize pain’), seems less important. 
This point also throws into some doubt the implication of LRS (92) that 
common-sense morality (in a Rossian form) is in any worse a position than util-
itarianism when it comes to explaining why the conduct claimed to be right 
really is right. There is nothing to prevent a ‘dogmatic intuitionist’ becoming a 
philosophical intuitionist, reflecting carefully on the principles she finds self-
evident, and concluding with the kind of pluralism we find in Ross. Indeed it 
seems that this is exactly what Ross himself did. 
Is Sidgwick then ‘unfair’ to the rivals of utilitarianism(144-8)? LRS defend 
him against the charge by suggesting that the main such rival is dogmatic intu-
itionism (147), and this view even in its strongest form can amount only to an 
unsatisfying ‘accidental aggregate of precepts’ (ME 102) which lacks any more 
fundamental justification. And, they claim, it can offer no such deeper justifi-
cation, since once its principles are made more precise then it ‘collapses like a 
pricked balloon’. 
I presume that the collapse here is meant to result from a failure to meet 
Sidgwick’s fourth condition of ‘highest certainty’, viz., lack of dissensus with 
the views of epistemic peers.10 But, first, there is no reason why the Rossian 
pluralist must make her principles more precise in the first place, because of 
the possibility of attaching a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause to any principle. Often – 
indeed usually – there is something to be said against breaking a promise. 
Second, if precision is required of the Rossian pluralist, then the same is true 
of the utilitarian, and she will then run into disagreements with utilitarian col-
leagues about the nature of pleasure and pain, well-being, interpersonal aggre-
gation, and so on. Finally, whether in precise form or not, there is a great deal 
of disagreement about both utilitarianism and Rossian pluralism, though my 
own hunch is that empirical research would demonstrate greater disagreement 
with utilitarianism than with the Rossian view, which incorporates many utili-
tarian elements but also includes principles forbidding injustice, ingratitude, 
and so on. 
LRS consider the objection that Sidgwick himself admits that his own alleg-
edly self-evident principles do not provide determinate answers in particular 
cases (ME 379), but suggest that the principles do not therefore violate his four 
conditions, since none of these requires such determinacy. But passages such 
as that at ME 228 which I discussed above make it clear that Sidgwick’s first 
 
10 LRS state this condition as one requiring agreement (144). Sidgwick in fact moved from a 
consensus condition to a non-dissensus condition in the 7th edn. (compare e.g. 320-1 of the first 
edition (1874) with ME 341-2). 
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condition requires such determinacy as part of precision. What he is saying at 
ME 379 is that the principles in 3.13 require the addition of a theory of well-
being to become practical; and this he provides in 3.14, on an intuitive basis 
(ME 400).11 But, as Sidgwick himself candidly admits (ME 150), empirical he-
donism is anything but determinate in particular cases. In other words, though 
Sidgwick provided clearer and more powerful arguments for utilitarianism 
than any of his predecessors, he did not advance the overall case for that view 
over its rivals. And he would have seen that had he applied his epistemic prin-
ciples as strictly to his own ethical view as he applied them to the views of oth-
ers. 
2. EGOISM AND EVOLUTION 
In chapter 7 of their book, LRS claim that a Sidgwickian response to certain 
attempts to use evolutionary theory to debunk moral judgements can itself re-
solve Sidgwick’s own ‘dualism of practical reason’. Later (378) they claim that 
this is the most important revision they make to Sidgwick’s position. I am per-
suaded by the argument against debunking, but I believe the Sidgwickian re-
sponse can do less than LRS suggest.12 
LRS begin (175-6) by outlining Sidgwick’s arguments against the view that, 
once we understand the origin of our moral intuitions, we will see them as 
caused by factors outside our control and hence as unreliable. First, an intui-
tion’s being ‘self-evident’ – that is, such that understanding it is sufficient to 
justify it – is quite consistent with its being caused. Second, we do not even 
have to show that the causes in question are likely to lead to true judgements, 
since this will lead us into a regress of justification. Finally, the causal judge-
ments in question are within the domain of science, and this does not extend 
to propositions concerning what we ought to do. 
Sidgwick distinguishes this form of general scepticism about moral intui-
tions from more limited claims about particular ethical beliefs. Using this dis-
tinction, LRS go on to examine the general argument in more detail, and es-
pecially that form of it developed by Sharon Street (179-85). According to 
Street, moral realists, once they recognize that our evaluative attitudes have 
 
11 Pace LRS 146, though they themselves later quote Sidgwick’s appeal to the ‘intuitive 
judgement’ of the reader (LRS 210). 
12 The following paragraphs adapt some material from my critical précis of the paper in Eth-
ics by LRS that became ch. 7 of their book (http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2012/12/ 
ethics-discussions-at-pea-soup-katarzyna-de-lazari-radek-and-peter-singer-the-objectivity-of-ethics-
1.html).  
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evolved, face an awkward dilemma. On the first horn, they accept that evolu-
tionary forces have no tendency to select beings with objectively true evalua-
tive attitudes, and so must draw the unpalatable conclusion that most of our 
evaluative judgements are unjustified. On the second, they claim that these 
forces were likely to select those able to grasp objective moral truths; but this 
claim goes against the most plausible scientific understanding of evolution, 
which sees it as heading in the direction of survival rather than truth. 
Street suggests that, had we evolved to be more like, say, lions, we would 
have been readier to accept the killing of others’ offspring than we are. LRS 
note the echo here of Darwin’s suggestion that, were we like bees, we would 
think it a duty of a mother to kill her fertile daughter. Sidgwick responded that 
such arguments do not touch the abstract principle of utilitarianism, which al-
lows for much variation in the rules of common morality. This, LRS plausibly 
claim, suggests that a modern Sidgwick, more informed that the real Sidgwick 
about the influence of evolution on morality, might readily impale himself on 
the first horn of Street’s dilemma, allowing that many of the rules of common-
sense morality are not based on objective truth. (It is worth noting that refer-
ence to evolution might also enable the modern Sidgwick to avoid the some-
what implausible notion that the utility of common-sense morality suggests 
that human beings have been ‘unconscious utilitarians’ (ME 454).) 
But, Street might object, if the principle of benevolence is objectively true, 
isn’t our arriving at it without any steer from evolution just a huge coinci-
dence? LRS rightly point out that Sidgwick can offer a plausible explanation of 
how we understand such principles: we use our reason. And at this point he 
can embrace the second horn of Street’s dilemma. A rational capacity would 
advance success in reproduction, and it might do that most effectively in a 
general, ‘untargeted’ form, which would allow us to enquire into the founda-
tions of mathematics or physics as well as to recognize self-evident moral 
truths. 
LRS then turn from the general to the particular form of the sceptical ar-
gument (185-96). They cite Sidgwick’s claim that no theory of the origin of our 
ethical intuitions has been offered that might throw his own abstract principles 
into doubt, as arising from sources which were likely to make them false. LRS 
suggest that this is still the case as far as universal benevolence is concerned, 
since the kinds of judgement most consistent with reproductive success will 
recommend helping one’s own children rather than complete strangers. Since 
LRS are going to use Sidgwick’s arguments about evolution in an attempt to 
resolve his dualism, it is worth noting that egoism is in as strong a position as 
universal benevolence in this context to resist debunking evolutionary argu-
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ments. What we would expect to evolve would be something like kin altruism, 
which is neither egoistic nor impartially benevolent. 
It is true, of course, that some concern for self might be expected to arise 
through evolutionary development, and LRS later (190) approvingly cite Folke 
Tersman’s attempt to use this point to debunk my own defence of a principle 
of self-interest, according to which each of us has a reason (not necessarily 
overriding) to advance her own good. So it might be claimed that egoism is 
just a development of that bias towards the self, a development tainted by its 
source in non-rational evolutionary processes. I myself am not persuaded by 
Tersman’s argument, and would want to appeal to some of the very Sidgwicki-
an counters to debunking arguments which LRS state earlier in their paper. 
Egoism, or the principle of self-interest, are justified by appeal to self-evidence; 
and the conclusions of reflection upon them, though it must be fully informed 
by an impartial grasp of evolutionary development, need not be overturned by 
that grasp. If it is pointed out to me that the reason I think that 7 + 5 = 12 is 
that my hunter-gatherer ancestors needed to develop some system for sharing 
out food at the end of the day, my belief will be unshaken. But note also that if 
Tersman’s point has any force, it applies equally to the principle of universal 
benevolence. We would expect evolution to produce some concern for others, 
and universal benevolence can be seen as an extension of that concern in the 
impartial direction in just the way that egoism might be taken to be an exten-
sion of concern for oneself in the direction of partiality. 
Since self-evidence can withstand reflection on the origins of beliefs, even 
kin altruism can resist debunking. LRS cite (189) – without questioning it – 
Sidgwick’s somewhat remarkable claim that it is ‘certainly not’ [my italics; LRS 
paraphrase as ‘not at all’] ‘self-evident that we owe more to our own children 
than to others whose happiness equally depends on our exertions’ (ME 346). I 
have little doubt that, were people to reflect properly on this conception of ex-
treme impartiality, the vast majority would reject it. But that of course is not 
the issue, as LRS point out: ‘This is not to say that the judgment that we have 
greater obligation to help our own children than to help strangers cannot be 
justified, but rather that if it is to be justified, it needs a form of justification 
that does not start from the idea that because we strongly feel that it is right, it 
must be true’. This is hard to deny; but it is a point that applies as much to 
universal benevolence, and indeed egoism, as it does to kin altruism. 
In support of the principle of universal benevolence, LRS claim that it re-
sults from ‘a process of careful reflection that leads us to take, as Sidgwick puts 
it, “the point of view of the universe”’ (193). This idea, they suggest, has been 
converged on by leading thinkers in various traditions, including Judaism, 
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Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Nor is there any plau-
sible evolutionary debunking argument against it. There are, then, three ele-
ments to establishing that an intuition has the greatest degree of reliability: (1) 
reflection; (2) agreement among careful thinkers; (3) lack of any debunking ar-
gument. 
By the point of view of the universe, LRS seem to mean something consid-
erably less rigorous than Sidgwick’s own utilitarian conception of pure impar-
tiality, seeing it in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, for example, as the Golden 
Rule. And if the egoist is permitted the same degree of latitude, she can claim 
that her view meets each of these three conditions as effectively as the princi-
ple of universal benevolence. The Golden Rule itself seems to imply that it is 
no less rational to have concern for oneself as for others, and self-love can 
plausibly be claimed to play an important role in the other three traditions 
mentioned by LRS, as well, of course, as the ancient western philosophical 
tradition, where if anything egoism rather than universal benevolence plays 
the more important role. And there has been no more careful thinker on these 
matters than Sidgwick himself! Further, as we have seen, the mere fact that 
some principle is partial is not enough to debunk it, even if – as with kin altru-
ism, and not with egoism – it lines up with evolutionary expectations. 
LRS’s conclusion, then, is that, because impartial universal benevolence 
withstands evolutionary debunking arguments, whereas partial principles such 
as egoism do not, Sidgwick’s dualism can be resolved in favour of benevolence. 
I have suggested that egoism, and indeed kin altruism, can withstand reflec-
tion as effectively as the principle of universal benevolence. I agree with LRS 
in rejecting appeal to reflective equilibrium in ethics (something I remember 
Joseph Raz’s pointedly describing as ‘unreflective equilibrium’). What is re-
quired is just the kind of rational, informed, impartial reflection on ultimate 
ethical principles advocated, and often (though not always) engaged in by 
Sidgwick. LRS are right too that Street’s evolutionary arguments are misdi-
rected against moral realism. Such arguments might often be useful in de-
bunking certain, unreflective, spontaneous moral responses, such as a visceral 
disgust at incest or homosexuality. But, at least as far as current evolutionary 
theory is concerned, they are largely irrelevant to first-order normative ethics 
(which philosophers do you know campaigning against incest or homosexuali-
ty?), as indeed is the neurological evidence based on fMRI scans used else-
where by Singer, Greene, and others to support the principle of universal be-
nevolence (put Frances Kamm or Judith Thomson in a scanner, and their 
brains will – I’m willing to bet – light up in the same way as Singer’s or 
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Greene’s when they’re asked to state their fundamental ethical principles). 
There are no quick fixes here. 
In response to an earlier presentation of my argument here (193-4), LRS 
claim that my map of the three positions under discussion – egoism, impartial 
benevolence, and kin altruism – is misleading, since kin altruism is ‘much 
closer, from an evolutionary perspective’ to egoism than to impartial benevo-
lence. They mean ‘behaviourally closer’, in the sense that the behaviour we 
would expect to result from the application of kin altruism would overlap a 
great deal with that resulting from egoism, while following the principle of im-
partial benevolence would diverge greatly from both. 
It may be true that many of us, conditioned as we are by the kin-altruistic 
sentiments evolution has produced in us, see our own self-interest as closely 
bound up with the well-being of our children. But the question is whether, had 
our ancestors had entirely egoistic sentiments, they would have acted in ac-
cordance with kin altruism. It seems to me not at all clear that they would. If 
all they cared about was their own personal well-being, why would they put 
themselves through the pains and efforts of child-birth and child-rearing? And 
if all had followed an entirely egoistic strategy, the result would have been a 
war of all against all that would have brought our species to an end. So if any-
thing impartial benevolence would have had greater survival value than ego-
ism, and hence would have been closer to kin altruism (especially since those 
our ancestors were most able to benefit would most of the time have been their 
own children). It is indeed true, as LRS point out, that universal benevolence 
requires altruism to distant members of our species and even members of oth-
er species, and it is not clear how this evolution can explain it. But egoism re-
quires lack of concern for our own children (if we even have any), and a com-
plete unreadiness to sacrifice anything, even something trivial in a case where 
it might prevent great suffering or death to those children. I don’t see how evo-
lution can explain that either. 
It is somewhat remarkable that, having concluded the Methods in a state of 
such internal incoherence, Sidgwick appears to have done little to try to re-
solve it. It was the same with disagreement with others: like LRS, when stating 
his own first-order view he largely ignored its implications and focused on 
agreement, though his own discussion of intuitionism demonstrates a clear 
awareness of the threat to self-evidence posed by disagreement with epistemic 
peers. What is needed now in normative ethics is a general facing up to the ex-
istence of such interpersonal disagreement, and a non-dogmatic and co-
operative attempt to make progress towards greater convergence. Indeed this 
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may be an area in which evolutionary theory (along with neuroscience, history, 
anthropology, psychology …) turns out to have real purchase. 
Perhaps partly because he does not allow room for practical judgement in 
individual cases between potentially conflicting principles, Sidgwick fails to 
consider a dualistic view according to which the principles of both egoism and 
of benevolence are pro tanto, such that in certain particular cases one principle 
is outweighed by the other. LRS object, in a discussion of Parfit’s sufficient-
reasons version of the dualism, that the dualism ‘undermines morality’ (162-4). 
This is because it allows that in certain cases one may act wrongly, but not ir-
rationally (since one’s action is justified by the egoist principle). According to 
LRS, if we want morality to be ‘truly important’ then we must show that we 
always have a decisive reason to act morally. This suggestion, however, sounds 
suspiciously like a case of the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy. Consider a version of 
the dualism in which the principle of universal benevolence outweighs the 
principle of egoism in every case except those in which, if the agent is to pro-
duce the greatest good, she must produce a trivial amount of good for very 
many people who are already much better off than she is at huge cost to her-
self. Since such a version would require the same sacrifices of most of us most 
of the time as the principle of universal benevolence, it is hard to see why it 
can be said to ‘undermine’ morality. It makes morality less important, of 
course, since any form of Sidgwickian dualism must recognize a non-moral 
normative principle. But this is not to undermine it. 
3. PLEASURE 
Sidgwick offers various accounts of pleasure, and it is not easy to say which, 
if any, we should view as canonical.13 LRS see his ‘fullest and most precise def-
inition’ as: 
feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or ex-
plicitly apprehends to be desirable; – desirable, that is, when considered merely 
as feeling, and not in respect of its objective conditions or consequences, or of 
any facts that come directly within the cognisance and judgment of others be-
sides the sentient individual. (ME 131) 
Let me call this the apprehension account. Shortly earlier, Sidgwick has 
said: 
 
13 Some of the following paragraphs adapt material from ch. 3 of my The Cosmos of Duty: 
Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015). 
130  ROGER CRISP 
 
 
 
the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to 
be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term ‘desirable’, 
in the sense previously explained. I propose therefore to define Pleasure – when 
we are considering its ‘strict value’ for purposes of quantitative comparison – as 
a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly ap-
prehended as desirable or – in cases of comparison – preferable. (ME 127; cited 
in part by LRS at 243) 
What is meant by ‘implicit’ apprehension? The contrast is most probably 
with cases in which the subject self-consciously recognizes and makes explicit 
to herself, or to others, that the feeling in question is desirable. To insist on ex-
plicit apprehension would be patently absurd, since such self-conscious recog-
nition is so rare. But note also Sidgwick’s restriction to the experience of intel-
ligent beings. This suggests that it may well not be his view that what makes an 
experience pleasant is its actually being apprehended (perhaps only implicitly) 
as desirable. That would have the obviously implausible implication that non-
intelligent beings could not experience pleasure.14 But of course his avoiding 
that implication will leave him with the question of just what it is that makes 
an experience pleasant. 
To which notion of ‘desirable’ is Sidgwick here referring? Sidgwick is pre-
sumably referring back to ME 1.9, where his final view is that the desirable is 
what ‘I should practically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason’ 
(ME 112) – in other words, what I ought to desire. On this view, then, pleasures 
are such that, if experienced by an intelligent being, they would – perhaps only 
implicitly – be apprehended as good. 
But questions arise here about why that being would take the view in ques-
tion were there not some important phenomenological property of her experi-
ence that might justify her desiring it, a property independent of the experi-
ence’s actually being desired by her or its being such that it would be desired 
by her. Further, Sidgwick seems to be assuming that any informed and intelli-
gent being must accept that pleasure is good. On the face of it, we can fairly 
easily imagine some intelligent and informed ascetic, who believes that all that 
matters in life is self-realization, contemplating some enjoyable experience and 
finding it worthless. Sidgwick’s response at ME 129 to a similar difficulty is to 
suggest that the ascetic must accept that the judgement that a feeling is desira-
ble is implied in its recognition as pleasure, but can go on to claim that philos-
ophy shows such a judgement to be mistaken. But it is not clear why the ascetic 
 
14 At ME 129, Sidgwick removes the reference to intelligent beings entirely, defining pleasure 
as ‘desirable feeling, apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling 
it. See also the passage from ME 131 quoted in the text above. LRS do not discuss the removal 
of this reference. 
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cannot deny this outright, seeking a purely non-evaluative, phenomenological 
account of pleasure, on the value of which a judgement can subsequently be 
made. 
Such an account faces an old objection, stated by Sidgwick himself just be-
fore the passage above from ME 127: 
Shall we then say that there is a measurable quality of feeling expressed by the 
word ‘pleasure’, which is independent of its relation to volition, and strictly un-
definable from its simplicity? – like the quality of feeling expressed by ‘sweet’, of 
which also we are conscious in varying degrees of intensity. This seems to be the 
view of some writers: but, for my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleas-
ure, – using the term in the comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to in-
clude the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications, no 
less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments, –  the only common 
quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to 
desire and volition expressed by the general term ‘desirable’ [...] (ME 127; partly 
quoted by LRS at 240-1) 
LRS speak approvingly of this heterogeneity objection:  
Sidgwick is on firm ground when he says that there is no quality of feeling that 
is common to everything that we call pleasure. I may get pleasure from feeling 
the warmth of the sun on my back as I lie on the grass on a fine summer’s day, 
and I may get pleasure from following an ingenious argument in a philosophy 
paper, but it is hard to see anything that these two feelings have in common. 
(244) 
I am surprised at how successful this objection to traditional hedonism has 
been. What these feelings have in common is that they both ‘feel good’, enjoy-
able, pleasurable, and we find little difficulty in merely comparing them in 
these terms: ‘which did you enjoy more – lying in the sun, or reading the phi-
losophy?’. (Of course, as Sidgwick pointed out so well, coming up with an an-
swer to such questions can be very difficult, but that is another matter.) 
LRS also claim (244) that recent work in neuroscience supports the hetero-
geneity objection, citing the following claim by Kent Berridge and Morten 
Kringelbach: ‘Pleasure is never merely a sensation ... Instead, it always requires 
the activity of hedonic brain systems to paint an additional ‘hedonic gloss’ on-
to a sensation to make it ‘liked’.’ 
What Berridge and Kringelbach mean here is that pleasure is never merely 
a sensation such as that of being warmed by the sun. The hedonic gloss they 
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speak of can itself be spoken of as a sensation, or at least as a single type of 
feeling.15 Consider what Berridge says elsewhere: 
[F]rom what we know so far, many of the same cortical and subcortical sub-
strates participate in pleasures as diverse as food, drugs, sex, parental, romantic 
and social interaction, money, music, and various cultural rewards. Of course, 
individual pleasures might also have their own pockets of unique neural sub-
strate within the brain. Yet even if sweet-unique, sex-unique, or other pleasure-
unique pockets exist, the general rule for mediation of sensory pleasures seems 
likely to be brain overlap and a neural common currency. … It is … conceivable 
that some few higher pleasures might turn out to be entirely separate from sen-
sory pleasures, involving no overlap at all. But in the end my bet is on substantial 
overlap for nearly all pleasures.16  
In certain passages other than those we have already discussed, Sidgwick 
drops not only the reference to intelligent beings, but also that to the very idea 
of apprehension, speaking merely of ‘desirable consciousness’ (ME 397; 398; 
402; 404). Such passages suggest that apprehension may have been introduced 
as part of an attempt by Sidgwick to capture the epistemological point he 
wishes to make about the privileged access individuals have to the quality of 
their own feelings considered merely as feelings, which itself is what he appeals 
to in excluding non-hedonistic evaluations of experience (see e.g. ME 128). At 
ME 398, Sidgwick defines the ultimate good as desirable consciousness and 
continues with a reference back to 2.2: 
According to the view taken in a previous chapter, in affirming Ultimate Good 
to be Happiness or Pleasure, we imply (1) that nothing is desirable except desir-
able feelings, and (2) that the desirability of each feeling is only directly cognisa-
ble by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it, and that therefore this par-
ticular judgment of the sentient individual must be taken as final on the ques-
tion how far each element of feeling has the quality of Ultimate Good. 
Here there is no reference to any special sense of ‘desirable’, so I presume 
that we should take it in its usual sense – that is, as equivalent to ‘good’. Once 
again, however, we – like the ascetic – may wish to object that the project of 
explaining the nature of pleasure is quite different from that of evaluating it. 
Further, the definition again raises the issue of exactly what it is about these 
feelings that makes them desirable. Sidgwick may be able to sidestep the objec-
 
15 At 246, LRS recognize that Berridge and Kringelbach see motivation as neurologically in-
dependent of pleasure. Presumably these neuroscientists would say the same about pleasure 
and those parts of the brain involved in cognition, including cognition of desirability. 
16 ‘Fundamental Pleasure Questions’, in Morten Kringelbach and Kent Berridge (ed.), Pleas-
ures of the Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7-23, at 17-18. 
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tion that we, like the ascetic, may make judgements about feelings based on 
non-hedonic properties (ME 127-8). But when it comes to the hedonistic 
judgement, Sidgwick appears to commit himself to the idea of pleasantness 
understood independently of its being merely desirable:  
If I in thought distinguish any feeling from all its conditions and concomitants 
– and also from all its effects on the subsequent feelings of the same individual 
or of others –  and contemplate it merely as the transient feeling of a single sub-
ject; it seems to me impossible to find in it any other preferable quality than that 
which we call its pleasantness, the degree of which is only cognisable directly by 
the sentient individual (ME 128; see 94; 398-9; 400-401). 
In the absence of any reference to an external state such as a desire, atti-
tude, or cognition, it is tempting to read Sidgwick as here reverting to what 
amounts to a feeling-tone position, according to which what pleasurable expe-
riences have in common, and what makes them valuable, is their having the 
special quality of feeling pleasant. I suggest, then, that Sidgwick at heart ac-
cepts the feeling-tone view of pleasure, but is misled by the heterogeneity ar-
gument into developing various forms of externalist account which are open to 
objection but in the end disappear from his theory. 
 
